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Spider Silk Jeans or Spider Silk Genes?
The Future of Genetic Testing in the Workplace
Presentation for Yale Medical School




When I was driving home one afternoon in August 2000, I
heard for the first time about spider silk genes. It's one of those
things heard on the radio that I so often hesitate to cite - even
from as reliable a source as NPR - because the journalist's ac-
count seems so unreal I think I either misheard or perhaps that the
data was incorrect or that the entire news story was a hoax. The
fashion reporter, of all sources, was explaining on the radio that
Spider silk genes were studied and cloned to make fabric for light-
weight athletic gear. To be woven into the loom, just like any other
threads. Visually, I could see the spider web in my brain and the
picture of genes used to make stronger, lighter genes made very
good sense to me. It was an image that holds logic. But the second
part of the same news story account made little sense: it was stated
that the same researchers were studying not the characteristics of
spider silk, but the ability to replicate spider silk genes, so that ath-
letes could undergo gene therapies that would enable their tendons
or muscles to heal more rapidly and withstand more stress. Fewer
surgeries for fewer reasons and the ability to heal less often. It all
sounds too good to be true. And perhaps it is. But what does the
prospect of spider silk genes in humans mean for the future of occu-
pational health?
This small potential example brings forth important questions
to examine about where the law draws the line for society regarding
any incentives or limits upon genetic research: Does society's rights
expressed under law trump the rights of individuals regarding ge-
* Ilise L. Feitshans, J.D., Sc.M., is an adjunct faculty member at Cornell
University, and The George Washington University.
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netic information and the application of genetic technologies to va-
rious situations? Whether discussing the information revealed
through genetic testing and diagnosis or gene therapy and engineer-
ing, important questions arise under law. Present public health
powers can be used to laws mandate testing or treatment to fix
some of the bad genes or enhance existing genetic traits. How much
of such genetic modification and retooling will law allow? Will spi-
der silk genes become part of the basketball or soccer player's job
descriptions? And what of the athletic parent who refuses such
treatment for an unborn offspring-will that parent have not done
enough for their child? Will the law allow employers to include ge-
netic traits in job criteria for employment? Or will employers be
required to accommodate every conceivable genetic disability
under ADA, prohibiting genetic discrimination even if a genetic
condition or the absence of a genetic enhancement exists by choice?
The laws that govern this area of human behavior, or human
interaction with other species are yet to be written. Likely, too, the
opportunity to write or implement any of these unwritten laws of
the future will be given to every person in this room, in three areas
of law and science: privacy; human rights and the legal definition of
"human being" and the application of those laws to labor relations,
specifically in workplace health and safety.
A. The Role of the Rule of Law
Critics of genetic research long ago cautioned, that "[t]he map-
ping of the genome .. .does not tell us anything about function,
which is what the gene sequences do in the organism,"' and there-
fore have raised several policy questions about genetic testing. Con-
sequently, critics of the Human Genome Project and related "Big
Science" spending in commercial fields have expressed their con-
cerns regarding the impact of new genetic tests on autonomy and
informed consent, mindful that there can never be true informed
consent in a workplace situation without also eroding protections
under law that prevent workers from accepting the "assumption of
the risk."
1 Sydney Brenner, The Human Genome: The Nature of the Enterprise, in
HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION: SCIENCE, LAW AND ETHICS 149, 6-7 (CIBA
Foundation Symposium Staff Press 1990).
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Despite the temptation to immediately implement the medical
advances that are represented by this new technology, the develop-
ment of genetic testing based on "merely" taking a "simple" blood
sample holds important implications for the autonomy of workers
and their right to informed consent before testing. Looking at
precedents in the case of HIV testing, the modern paradigm has
shifted away from the "invasiveness" of testing, towards a hard look
at the emotion burden that testing places upon patients. At pre-
sent, there are no clear bioethical or legal standards to determine,
how much information is necessary to be informed? Can a rational
patient nonetheless make decisions that appear to be informed but
are not, and are contrary to their own best interest?
This brings into question the conflict between principles of be-
neficence and principles of autonomy in bioethics and their implica-
tions for the theoretical construct that surrounds genetic testing in
the workplace and any safeguards that ensuring that workers have
undergone requisite gene therapies, as a part of occupational health
care. To the extent that occupational health services also deal with
pregnant workers, the role of gene therapies, fetal surgeries or ge-
netic screening and testing as a part of prenatal care, possibly in
response to workplace toxins or other aspects of the working envi-
ronment, may also become included in the panoply of services that
will be included in modern occupational health care. Further, pre-
serving the workers' rights to demand informed consent procedures
such as counseling and the dissemination of information is crucial to
preserving the right to refuse testing and treatment.
B. Implications for a "New Eugenics"
Just when U.S. President Clinton joined other world leaders to
announce the completion of genetic cartography, four philosophers
from academia have stepped forward together to perform an "ethi-
cal autopsy" of eugenics: exploring the implications of eugenic the-
ory for new genetic interventions. From Chance to Choice:
Genetics and Justice 2 could not be more timely. Appearing in print
2 ALLEN BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GE-
NETICS AND JUSTICE (Cambridge University Press 2000) (providing a succinct and
concise statement of the questions that society will confront as genetic technology
and interventions become commonplace in the years ahead). See also Ilise L. Feit-
shans, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, 820 NEW ENG. J. MED (Sept.
2000).
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contemporary to press releases heralding the completion of full-
scale mapping of the human genome, the authors could not have
written for themselves a better timing for their book. As the title
suggests, their treatise raises fundamental issues of justice, fairness
and equality that lurk in the shadows of eugenics, just beneath the
glitzy research of "Big Science" used to map the human genome.
What does it mean when society views a trait as desirable? Does
that make the trait good? Which traits trump others? Does genetic-
based medicine only look for disease (whatever that is) or also for
desirable traits? If so, which desirable traits are more important?
At the root of the eugenics movement was the fear that "racial
poisons were threatening the health of the race; that the criminal,
mentally ill, and morally dissolute were out breeding the more up-
standing elements of society. ' 3 One basic tenet of the eugenics
movement was "biological determinism-the idea that biology lies
at the root of most human talents and disabilities."' 4 States enacted
sterilization laws aimed at "purifying and keeping pure blood in
America." In 1907, Indiana passed the United States' first steriliza-
tion law, forcing the sterilization of people based on genetic de-
fects. 5 The United States Supreme Court upheld the sterilizations;
the Court has never specifically overruled this decision.6 The Court
upheld Virginia's forced sterilization law for "mental defectives"
and found that the law did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.7 Similar laws, never over-
turned, form an important part of our society's legal matrix.
I. PRIVACY
A. Personal Privacy versus Commercialism
"Genetic information is not only of value to the individual pa-
tient; employers, insurers, educational institutions, law enforcement
officials and others may wish to gain access to an individual's per-
sonal genetic profile ... [with a] great potential for third parties to
3 Robert M. Proctor, Genomics and Eugenics: How Fair is the Comparison?,
in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 57, 60 (George J. Annas
& Sherman Elias eds., 1992).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 61 (citing Act of March 9, 1907, ch. 215, 1907 Ind. Acts 377 (held
unconstitutional in Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921), repealed by
Act of February 23, 1963, Ch. 17, 1963 Ind. Acts 12.)
6 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (per curium).
7 Id. at 207.
[Vol. X¥IlI
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misuse information." Yet, there is no national consensus whether
privacy of any type should be protected and what that law looks
like in the United States. It seems that most people want to protect
their personal privacy, but also want information about the people
around them. Privacy rights are a fragile cluster of protections for
personhood. "Although compulsory vaccinations, compelled blood
tests, extractions of contraband narcotics from the rectal cavity and
even surgical removal of a bullet have sometimes been upheld on a
showing of clear necessity, procedural regularity, and minimal pain,
in each case the matter has been taken with enough seriousness to
warrant a conclusions that an aspect of personhood was at stake,
and that government's burden was to provide more than minimal
justification for its action." 9
Consequently, the current status of privacy law in the U.S.A. is
a patchwork of rules with many exceptions. There is no U.S. Consti-
tutional right of privacy, other than relating to sexual relations be-
tween married people, to clarify or defend the right to privacy that
people, especially occupational physicians prize. There is an impor-
tant question whether there exists any especially protected informa-
tion within the constitutionally protected "zone of privacy"
concerning genetic information in personal or reproductive decision
making, as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court. Privacy preserves
the right to the most intimate forms of freedom that impact on per-
sonhood and sense of self.10 "Few values so fundamental to society
as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory,"1 1 according
to Westin. He traced the role of privacy in the animal world and in
primitive societies, fundamental and inherent character within so-
cial organizations. The flip side of privacy is the public interest in
8 Lori B. Andrews, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: Genetics and
the Law: Introduction, 39 EMORY L.J. 619, 624 (1990).
9 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1331-1332 (4th
ed. 2000).
10 See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L.
REV.1431 (1992) (writing about Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), "the
most private of all privacy cases,"at 1437, 1448. "By recognizing a physical zone of
privacy into which the state may not intrude to interdict consensual intimate con-
duct, the Supreme Court has shown itself to be sensitive to the mutually constitu-
tive relationship between the intimate life of the individual and the places in which
that intimate life unfolds.") Id. See also RUTH MACKLIN, GENETICS AND THE LAW
III (Plenum Press, 1985).
11 See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (Atheneum New York
1967).
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the otherwise protected information itself: If there are genes with
high risk for Alzheimer's disease or some other disorder, should the
newspaper be allowed or compelled to publish the President's gen-
ome? Genetic information can trafficked, to target markets for pro-
curing or selling commodities based on individual genetics.
The race to find genetic information and apply genetic technol-
ogy unleashed a fierce battle in public health law regarding individ-
ual rights to privacy and informed consent, competing with society's
interest in applying genetic information for commercial purposes
and public health planning. Examples include: mandatory testing
and registration of genetic information; commercial access to the
names and identifying information of people with desirable genes
that could be purchased for medical purposes, such as creating new
tissue for gene therapies.
Is there a right to refuse treatment, or testing, as a part of
genetic privacy regarding medical decisions? Is there a
right to keep the "magic gene" that will cure someone
else's ailment for oneself, one's family or the highest
bidder? Or an obligation to accept such a cure, regard-
less of an individual's will or the will of a parent regard-
ing the future health of a minor child because of the
greater public good? Will people who are tested and re-
fuse treatment for themselves or their children be held
liable in tort for the subsequent consequences of their
refusal? Even if the refusal is part of their religious be-
liefs? Is there informed refusal?
Heralding the benefits of genetic advances, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated "Scientists, among them Nobel laureates, are quoted
suggesting that genetic research may pose a serious threat to the
human race ... We are told that genetic research and related tech-
nological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it
may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may
tend to depreciate the value of human life .... We disagree.' 2
12 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1980); E. RICHARD
GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN Bio-
LOGICAL MATERIALS (1996); PAULINE NEWMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AND THE NEW BIOLOGY, Summer 1997, at 46.
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1. Benefits to Society That Outweigh Individual Genetic Privacy
Two theories of ownership of this information have emerged under
the law:
a. Individual Ownership: Genetic information innately belongs to
any one individual because it is personal and medical in nature.
b. Common Inheritance of Mankind: Yet, because genetic inheri-
tance is shared within families, whole races or ethic groups, there is
a competing view that it is actually "owned" by not one person, but
society as a whole. This theory views gene pool information as pub-
lic property because it was developed with public funds, and the use
of this data benefits society as a whole, rather than any given indi-
vidual. This has implications for both: the testing and use of seem-
ingly personal genetic information, and for the determination of
ownership of "discoveries" and patentable inventions based on ma-
nipulation of genetic material. It would be difficult, from the stand-
point of practice, to set forth a consistent rule that would uphold
personal privacy in genetic information while also promoting com-
mercial ownership and development of genetic technologies using
genetic information. The inherent conflict in these two positions
may explain the schizophrenic attitude regarding privacy and confi-
dentiality manifest in the U.S. laws.
SALE OF DATABASES OF HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION:
Personal health information is presently transferred to third
parties, including the Medical Information Bureau ("MIB") under
existing insurance laws, with no limitation based on the patient's
general release at the time of treatment. This database can include
genetic information, including genetic predictors for disease and
candidates for transfer of desirable genetic material. There is fear
also that such databases could be used for genetic discrimination in
employment, or regarding eligibility for health insurance. Writing
in reaction to a case where harm caused by gossip did not give rise
to a cause of action at common law, 13 Warren and Brandeis stated:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon
advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some
retreat from the world, and man, under the refining in-
13 Pollard v. Photographic Co. Pollard v. Photographic Co, 40 Ch. Div. 345
(1888).
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fluence of culture, has become more sensitive to pub-
licity so that solitude and privacy have become more
essential to the individual ... The possibility of future
profits is not a right of property which the law ordina-
rily recognizes; it must, therefore, be an infraction of
other rights which constitutes the wrongful act, and
that infraction is equally wrongful, whether its results
are to forestall the profits that the individual himself
might secure by giving the matter a publicity obnox-
ious to him, or gain an advantage at the expense of his
mental pain and suffering.'
4
2. A Broader View of Ownership
If genetic information is indeed the property of more people
than any given individual, this has implications for individual ge-
netic privacy, public health strategies and intellectual property as
well as privacy regarding the disclosure of information. Property
rights therefore may have implications for a variety of social and
private contracts regarding genetic information and the subsequent
'use of genetic technology, based on personal genomic status. Legal
resolution of these property rights will determine: who to tell ge-
netic information, (Mother? Father? Extended Family? Employers?
Insurers? Prospective spouse and family? Other third parties?) Us-
ing property analysis, individual genetic information could be safe-
guarded in a shroud of procedural confidentiality. On the other
hand, the individual right to genetic privacy may be outweighed, on
balance by countervailing social and commercial interest: informa-
tion should be readily available to third parties for the greater so-
cial good of promoting public health or generating financial profits.
Balancing these existing rights against individuals in favor of the
public health or commercial rights may mean that an individual
who has a "genetic defect" required to change it, or to make availa-
ble desirable genes for medical or corporate purposes. Extending
these concepts from individuals to commercial uses of genetic infor-
mation has implications for the mixture of human genetic material
with other genetic information from other species, for genetically
manufactured foods, cloning and sale of human body parts made
14 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 5 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 204 (1890).
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from transgenic (or multi-parent genetic) material and genetic
materials used in medical treatments. In light of new genetic tech-
nologies, society must decide whether or not to apply existing under
disability laws, insurance laws and other regulatory mechanisms, to
protect people against suffering from discrimination based on ge-
netic conditions.
3. Who Cares About Privacy? Precedents Regarding Wrongful
Use of Genetic Information and Eugenic Laws
Changes in technology alter our understanding of health. 15 The
disease that was viewed as incurable decades ago can now be cured
and the irritating conditions that people lived with slowly become
the red flag signals for other diseases and illness; thus changing
whether the same person is regarded as manifesting an illness or in
"good health." This is especially true for genetic diseases. For ex-
ample, in the 1970s, sickle cell anemia screening programs were
aimed at identifying carriers of sickle cell anemia, a disease com-
mon among African Americans and also among ethnic groups from
Asia minor. Government programs were identified both healthy
"carriers" individuals who had sickle cell anemia. The mistaken no-
tion that carriers might be hyper-susceptible to certain workplace
toxins such as benzene, lead, cadmium, carbon monoxide, and cya-
nide was used as an accepted reason to exclude black workers out
of high-paying jobs in the heavy industries. In this time period,
many state legislatures mandated sickle cell testing, leading to fur-
ther fear and discrimination. Inadequate measures to keep the test
results confidential led to stigmatization and discrimination against
sickle cell carriers in employment. Ignorance about sickle cell trait
compared to the genetic illness, sickle cell anemia, was mixed up
with other prejudices, and became the touchstone of discrimination
against many carriers of the trait even though "carriers" could not
15 World Health Organization ("WHO") Const. Preamble ("Health is a
state of complete, physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the ab-
sence of disease and infirmity."). This remarkably broad definition bespeaks the
basic human need for health. For this reason, it has been the undisputed bench-
mark of many practical standards as well as a host of national health laws. This
definition is so encompassing, however, that it has been criticized as making virtu-
ally any human endeavor a matter of health jurisdiction. It encompasses vaccines
and preventive strategies as well as medical programs.
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develop the disease. 16 Thirty states enacted legislation requiring Af-
rican Americans to be tested for the sickle cell trait. Twenty-one
states have not repealed their sickle cell screening laws. Some states
required children be tested upon entering school while others
would only issue marriage licenses if the individuals had been
tested. 17 Thus, the United States Air Force Academy refused Afri-
can Americans who were carriers of sickle cell to participate in pilot
training, fearing that the low-oxygen environment in flight would
cause them to undergo a sickling episode. 8 Under these theories,
there is a national if not international communitarian interest in any
person's health that transcends notions of individual privacy.
B. Public Health Implications of Genetic Testing At Work
Existing law may be interpreted to address genetic technolo-
gies to require mandatory testing or treatment to "correct" so-
called genetic disorders ranging from arthritis to obesity and change
personal attributes like intelligence and skin color. This information
can potentially benefit society: cures and treatments for currently
incurable genetic disorders. Critics fear that a concept of "genetic
fitness" could be used to choose between parents in custody battles,
or to determine whether future employment or incurability without
regard to other human traits. 19 Concepts of genetic fitness exist
16 PATRICIA A. KING, THE PAST AS PROLOGUE: RACE, CLASS, AND GENE
DISCRIMINATION, IN GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES
(George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992) (noting that these programs began
with the best intentions, and were supported by African American leaders until
they realized that such measures "would be used to stereotype and disadvantage
the very people they sought to help.").
17 National Sickle Cell Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-294, 86 Stat. 136
(as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300B (1976) (withholding federal funding from states
unless sickle cell testing is voluntary).
18 See King, supra note 16, at 99 (discussing how the mandatory testing of
African-Americans for sickle cell anemia negatively affected them).
19 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, (OTA), Report to Con-
gress at the Request of the Board of the 101 s Congress "Genetic Monitoring and
Screening in the Workplace" 15, tbls.1-2 "Genetic Tests Available and Total Amer-
icans Affected"(1990). In that report the OTA staff further notes at page 20:
The workplace is an atypical setting for receiving information of
such personal importance. It should not be overlooked that when
genetic monitoring or screening are used in the workplace, the fo-
cus of the tests-the person-is being provided with information
that could have a significant impact on decisions unrelated to em-
ployment: marriage; procreation and lifestyle. The absence of refer-
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under eugenic-based sterilization laws from the early 20th century
that were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court and have not been
repealed.20 Absent uniform privacy and confidentiality protections
throughout the United States, health care institutions, insurance
companies and self-insured employers who transmit health infor-
mation through interstate commerce, patients may lack the basis for
meaningful consent to disclosure of information. The costs and ben-
efits of genetic technologies may force to closure previous policy
debates about privacy regarding medical data.
THE STATE'S OBLIGATION TO PROTECT GENETIC INFORMATION:
The clearest and most succinct statement of the traditional ap-
proach to regulation of public health policy under law is Frank
Grad's classic work, The Public Health Law Manual. 21 This invalu-
able reference covers the legal sources of public health powers, re-
striction of the person, permits, licenses and registrations,
abatement of nuisances, civil sanctions, etc. in the United States.
Traditional approaches of public health regulation, include: quaran-
tine and other restrictions of the person, mandatory testing for vac-
cination, and registration and reporting of communicable disease.
These measures are firmly based in the well-established doctrine of
parens patriae, the societal need for control over disease and public
health uses of personal information in order to protect the public
good. Under this construct, the so-called "police power" of the
State provides the traditional justification that supports invasions of
privacy or breaches of confidentiality, that are both implicit and ex-
pressly articulated in public health laws following the traditional
rals to trained professionals and reimbursement for costs of
additional tests or counseling may be prohibitive factors influenc-
ing an individual's ability to obtain additional information. Genetic
counseling and appropriate referrals for those at risk should accom-
pany the use of either genetic monitoring or screening.
This statement was followed by discussion of then current data regarding the use of
genetic monitoring and screening by Fortune 500 companies. See also Brian R.
Gin, Genetic Discrimination: Huntington's Disease and the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1406, 1411 (1997) (suggesting that in the future adop-
tion agencies may choose suitable parents based on their genetic potential and that
the same information may be used by courts in determining custody of children in
divorce settlements).
20 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
21 THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW MANUAL, AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH Asso-
CIATION (1990).
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public health paradigm. The use of the police power is rooted in the
government's obligation to the people, as protector of the people in
the social contract between a populace and its government.
C. Privacy Rights Under the U.S. Constitution
Genetic information from research may create preventive
treatments, provide information about protective effects of genetic
conditions considered to be defects; or about new diseases that
were never viewed as genetically linked. Some conditions may be
an admixture of environmental factors and genetic propensities.
Other genes will not impact on the individual who is a "carrier," but
may, through the happenstance of fate and attraction, appear in the
next generation, depending on who the parent chooses as partners
in reproduction. What will a judicial system in the twenty-first cen-
tury do with information that particular genes give individuals a
propensity for certain types of behavior? Will employers have the
right to set forth particular genetic characteristics as part of their
job criteria for employment? Or will such criteria violate the
precepts of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") which
prohibits discrimination? Will any of the embryos and fetal tissue
cloned or raised using genetic technologies be endowed with indi-
vidual rights and "human" status? Will there be a new underclass,
created from materials using genetic technologies, or from the "old-
fashioned" form of human reproduction without enhanced genetic
techniques?
Constitutional basis for protection of privacy rights are found
in several Amendments. Henkin22 views privacy rights as a public
good. These rights include protection from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Under his construct, "The essential private right,"
freedom, was established by the 13th amendment.23 The U.S. Su-
preme Court created "substantive due process" as a limitation of
the authority of government. 24 "The Constitution does not confer
private rights; they are antecedent to and independent of the consti-
tution ... Justices Stone and Cardozo suggested that the freedoms
of speech, press and religion required extraordinary judicial protec-
tion against invasions even for the public good, because of their
place at the foundations of democracy and because of the unrelia-
22 Louis Henkin, A Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1977).
23 Id. at 1419.
24 Id. at 1411.
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bility of the political process in regard to them. ' 25 "Since the Con-
stitution . . . protects rights which partake of privacy it protects
other aspects of privacy as well, indeed it recognizes a general com-
plete right of privacy."
'26
First Amendment concepts of freedom of association include
"[t]he associational model of the right of privacy presumptively in-
sulates its holders from state interference even when that right is
exercised in the public sphere."2 7 This theory of privacy severely
limits the government's ability to require genetic testing or to com-
pel disclosure of genetic information within marriage or in repro-
ductive decision making. Under the Fourth Amendment,
prohibition against warrantless intrusions extends to the home as
well as the person. This protection is limited to non-criminal pur-
poses and might not reach DNA "fingerprinting" used in criminal
prosecutions. Under the Ninth Amendment, this right against ge-
netic discrimination is grounded fundamental attributes of the per-
son, also as discussed in the jurisprudence of international human
rights. The touchstone for U.S. Constitutional privacy, to the extent
it exists, is embedded within "those personal rights that are funda-
mental... not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights."
In Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut,28 the
Court stated that a married couple's right to privacy regarding con-
traception outweighed a state law that prohibited the use of contra-
ceptives. Relevant to genetic privacy for purposes of family
planning, the Court viewed the case as one that "operates directly
on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's
role in one aspect of that relation. '29
As stated in Eisenstat v. Baird, "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."' 30 This view could be construed as having implications for
25 See id. at 1428, 1429.
26 See id. at 1421 ("[Slince the Constitution in various 'specifics' of the Bill of
Rights and in their penumbra, protects rights which partake of privacy, it protects
other aspects of privacy as well, indeed it recognizes a general, complete right of
privacy.").
27 U.S. Constitution, First Amendment, discussed by Thomas, supra.
28 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
30 Eisenstat v. Baird, 405 U.S. 453 (1972) (striking down a State law that
prohibited unlicensed distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people).
20011
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the disclosure of human genomic information during family plan-
ning, absent an overarching public health interest. The U.S. Su-
preme Court was not contemplating sophisticated advances in
genetic testing when it made this statement, but the right to privacy
may prevent governmental intrusion via mandatory genetic testing,
absent a strong governmental interest. The Court did not, however
indicate which governmental interests would be sufficiently impor-
tant to outweigh personal privacy concerns and thereby justify in-
trusion into personal privacy, if information was needed by third
parties to save their life.
Under the Ninth Amendment also, abortion cases have deter-
mined that Constitutional protections for privacy extend to the de-
cision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.31 The U.S.
Supreme Court took a broadbrush approach to safeguard informa-
tion surrounding abortion decisions finding "freedom from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into individual decisions in matters
of child bearing. '32 Autonomous decision making was not to be
"burdened" by a statutory requirement for parental notification re-
garding the decision to have an abortion.33
The government's ability to limit the exercise of independent
decision making in matters that would otherwise be considered pri-
vate was discussed in Whalen v. Roe.34 The constitutional right to
privacy in personal information was outweighed by the legitimate
state interest in preventing drug abuse, when a state was allowed to
require mandatory reporting of names and other identifying infor-
mation for persons who were the recipients of prescriptions for con-
trolled substances.35 It seems as if one interpretation of the case
could allow it to serve as precedent for allowing genetic testing of
individuals by the government, insofar as it asserts the govern-
ment's ability to gather data when there is a state interest in other-
wise confidential, personal information. Under Whalen,
government interests in the name of public health can provide a
compelling state interest.
31 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing the right to terminate or
continue pregnancy).
32 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
775 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
33 See id.
34 See id. at 772.
35 Whalen, Comm'r of Health of New York. V. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
SPIDER SILK GENES
Protection against disclosures, even if self-incriminating, is
found under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. In Justice Brandeis'
dissent to Olmstead v. United States, concerning the admissibility of
evidence obtained by wiretapping of homes and offices, he argued
that the Government should not have the ability "to obtain disclo-
sure in court of what is whispered in the closet."' 36 Thus, Justice
Brandeis recognized privacy interests against government intrusion
under the U.S. Constitution's Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Taken
together, these Amendments "conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.
'37
Brandeis' opinion applied principles he had written about in a
famous law review article entitled "The Right to Privacy." 38 Al-
though privacy is not viewed as an inherent right under the com-
mon law.39 The precinct call for an expanded scope to legal
protections for the concept of individual privacy decried several de-
velopments of the modern age, is often cited by the dissent through-
out the 20th century cases about privacy. "That the individual shall
have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as
the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time
to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection....
Later there came a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feel-
ings and intellect. '40 Gradually the scope of these rights broadened;
and now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life-
the right to be let alone .... "41
Warren and Brandeis recognized the need for legal remedy for
unauthorized use of portraits and of modern inventions that repli-
cated images and speech without authorization by the individual
who was the subject of the portrait. This has direct relevance for
genetic testing and cloning of human genetic material for medicine,
"spare parts" or creating new human beings. Genetic technology
can isolate and examine in detail the chromosomal image of an in-
36 See id. at 606 (Brennan, J. concurring).
37 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
38 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 5 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
39 Id., at 213 (the benchmark for discussion of privacy jurisprudence under
the common law).
40 Id. at 193.
41 Id.
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dividual without the individual's knowledge or consent, and in a
manner that has intrusive effects of embarrassment, social stigma
and even detrimental judgments by unseen third parties, just as
photography once had. Warren and Brandeis understood these
problems, raised by new technologies for replication of a human
image, as they stated the case for judicial recognition of these
rights. Warren and Brandeis' ideas, although appealing from a con-
ceptual standpoint, were not widely embraced by the courts in the
twentieth century; although their influential documentation was
often cited, theirs did not become the majority view. Their views
represented the high water mark of rights to privacy that "ought"
exist, rather than a realistic appraisal of rights under common law
and therefore remains important when examining new assaults
against personal rights to information used in decision making. Le-
gal scholars in the 2 0th century have used their article as the corner-
stone for the principle that there is a right to privacy that is intrinsic
in "personhood." For Warren and Brandeis construct, rights as de-
rived not from contract or special trust, "but are rights against the
world.... The principle which protects personal writings and any
other productions of the intellect or of the emotions is the right of
privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it ex-
tends this protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and
to personal relation, domestic or otherwise. ' 42 This theory, not
codified in U.S.A. laws is found under international law. UDHR
Article 12, regarding privacy states: "No one shall be subject to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspon-
dence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks. '43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Ar-
ticle 17.1 provides: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or un-
lawful interference with his (sic) privacy, family, home . . ." and
further assures the right to protection against such "attacks" against
privacy.44 Similarly, ICCPR Article 19.2 guarantees the right to re-
ceive and impart information "of all kinds."' 45 This provision sug-
42 Id.
43 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art. 17.1.
45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art. 19.2.
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gests the ICCPR provides protection for genetic privacy within the
family and for personal health information.
46
1. Applying Privacy Principles to Genetic Information
Privacy of medical records has implications under consumer
protection laws as well as insurance laws. If a patient discloses per-
sonal information to a health care professional believing it is pri-
vate, the professional may be liable in tort for disclosure without
the patient's consent. Laws do not protect confidential medical in-
formation that is disclosed with the patient's consent. Most medical
record and claims data enter the public domain through the Use of
blanket consent forms As a condition to apply for insurance or pro-
cess claims. The forms often permit release of information to
others not directly involved as a provider, i.e., the Medical Informa-
tion Bureau ("MIB"). MIB tracks patient information for insurance
companies to evaluate applications for coverage and to develop
targeted marketing. This data is made available to MIB through
the general release. Several laws have been proposed in Congress
provide uniform and confidentiality for individual genetic
information.
2. Federal Regulation of Health Insurance
Use of medical records and claims data by third parties, such as
medical and health policy researchers, employers, marketers, public
health officials and the law enforcement community has led to Con-
gressional hearings addressing the privacy rights of individuals bal-
anced against access to the data, including medical and health
policy researchers, whose work may benefit the public at large.47
46 See ALASKA STAT. §18.065.087 (1998) (authorizing the Department of
Public Safety to maintain a central registry of sex offenders and to make the fol-
lowing information about those offenders available to the public: name, address,
photograph, place of employment, date of birth, crime for which convicted, date of
conviction, place and court of conviction and length of sentence).
47 See Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994, H.R. 4077, 103d Cong.
(1994); Medical Information Protection Act of 1998, S. 2609, 105th Cong. (1998);
Consumer Health and Research Technology (CHART) Protection Act, H.R. 3900,
105th Cong. (1998); Health Care Personal Information Nondisclosure Act of 1998,
S. 1921, 105th Cong. (1998); Medical Information Privacy and Security Act, S.
1368, 105th Cong. (1997); Medical Privacy in the Age of New Technologies Act of
1997, H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. (1997); and Fair Health Information Practices Act of
1997, H.R. 52, 105th Cong. (1997).
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Title V of The Patient Protection Act, passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives on July 24, 1998, contained provisions that would au-
thorize the Use of identifiable health care information for "health
care operations. '48 Future laws following these bills may: prohibit
denial or cancellation; prohibit changing premiums, terms, or condi-
tions of policies; prohibit the request or requirement of a genetic
test; or protect individual confidentiality "on the basis of any mo-
lecular genetic information about a healthy individual.
'49
Although state laws historically stipulated that medical records
were the sole property of the health care provider, most state laws
also required health care professionals to maintain the confidential-
ity of a patient's personal informationi 0 Medical records and
claims data has spurred advances in quality and access to medical
treatment. Access is needed by medical and health policy research-
ers to medical records and claims data has spurred advances in
quality and access to medical treatment. The American regulatory
regime on medical record access has politely been characterized as
"fragmented" and less politely as a "black hole."'5' For this reason,
the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act ("HIPAA")
specifically requires insurers to provide on-going health insurance
to previously insured individuals without regard to "pre-existing
conditions." Pregnancy and genetic conditions are expressly in-
cluded in the list of situations that cannot be the legitimate reason
48 See Patient Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. §1185 (1998).
49 See S. Res. 89, 105th Cong. § 9811 (1997); H.R. Res. 306, 105th Cong.
§ 713 (1997); S. Res. 1045, 105th Cong. (1997); S. Res. 1694, 104th Cong. § 2
(1996); H.R. 2748, 104th Cong. (1995); S. Res. 1898, 104th Cong. § 302 (1996); S.
422, 105th Cong. § 402 (1997). See also H.R. 341, 105th Cong. § 6 (1997) (prohibit-
ing an insurer from rejecting, denying, limiting, canceling, refusing to renew, in-
creasing the rates, or otherwise affecting coverage).
50 See Helena Gail Rubenstein, If I Am Only for Myself What Am I? A
Communitarian Look at the Privacy Stalemate, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 203 (1999).
51 See id., at 203 (citing U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy); see also WIL-
LIAM W. LOWRANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PRIVACY &
HEALTH RESEARCH: A REPORT TO THE SEC'Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES 6
(1987); see also Richard C. Turkington, Medical Record Confidentiality, Law, Sci-
entific Research and Data Collection in the Information Age, 25 J.L. MED. & ETH-
ICS 113, 115 (1997); see also SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, STATEMENT ON THE
INTRODUCTION OF THE MEDICAL INFORMATION PRIVACY AND SECURITY ACT
(1999).
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for exclusion from a policy, despite the expense and high-risk
among these populations.
52
D. Ignorance is Bliss: The Ultimate Bastion of Privacy
Discovery of the gene for Huntington's Disease has altered the
meaning of genetic testing and brought closer the promise of a cure
for affected families. At the same time, genetic discoveries have
raised issues of personal genetic privacy at the cutting edge of ge-
netic jurisprudence. In light of these developments, the Interna-
tional Huntington Association ("IHA") and the World Federation
of Neurology ("WFN") have proposed Recommendations to pro-
vide guidelines for the Use of the Huntington's Disease Molecular
Genetics Predictive Test. 53 The first recommendation and com-
ments indicates that individuals should have updated information
"in order to make an informed voluntary decision. '54 The second
recommendation ensures that taking the test is the "sole choice" of
each individual, free of coercion from families, physicians insurance
52 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 264, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2); see
also Protecting Our Medical Information, Rights, Responsibilities and Risks: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 105th Cong. (1997);
Confidentiality of Patient's Medical Records: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Gov't Mgmt. Info. & Tech. of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform & Oversight,
105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Richard Harding, M.D., on behalf of health in-
surers, medical and health policy researchers, and pharmaceutical companies);
Confidentiality of Medical Information: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on La-
bor and Human Res., 105th Cong. (1998).
53 See Concept: Ethical Issues Policy Statement on Huntington's Disease Mo-
lecular Genetics Predictive Test: IHA and WFN Research Group on Huntington's
Chorea: Comm. on Genetic Testing. 94 J. NEUROL. Sci. 1989, 327-32 (Establishing
a committee with the specific task of preparing such guidelines was decided at the
WFN and IHA conferences in Lille, September, 1985. The recommendations were
adopted by both organizations at their respective meetings in Vancouver, Canada,
June 30 to July 3, 1989.).
54 World Federation of Neurology, International Huntington's Association
WFN-IHA GUIDELINES, NUMBER 1 states that individuals should have updated in-
formation "in order to make an informed voluntary decision." See also, Ilise L.
Feitshans, Genetic Testing During Pregnancy: Implications For Womens' Autono-
mous Medical Decisions Under the Genome Project (Thesis for Masters of Science
Degree), JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF HYGIENE AND PUBLIC HEALTH
(1996) (on file with the University), citing WFN-IHA Recommendations with com-
mentary, at page 61.
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companies, employers or other third parties,55 although recommen-
dations 3 and 3.1 indicate that "the patient should be encouraged to
select a partner to accompany him/her throughout the different
stages" of testing. The test would, under this approach, be offered
without regard to financial status but only to people who have
reached majority, with a strict prohibition against testing for the
purpose of adoption. Recommendation 2.5 urges that laboratories
meet "rigorous standards." Recommendation 4 prohibits the disclo-
sure of test results to third parties, absent the written consent of the
patient. Recommendation 5.3 indicates the types of formation that
should be given to the patient regarding potential consequences of
taking the test. These consequences include the effect of test results
on the individual patient, patient's spouse, parents, other family
members, and socio-economic consequences pertaining to "employ-
55 World Federation of Neurology, International Huntington's Association
WFN-IHA GUIDELINES, NUMBER 2 states that individuals should have the opportu-
nity for individual choice free from coercion by families, physicians, insurance
companies employers or third parties" This Recommendation is problematic, be-
cause of the broad brush with which it has been written. Social pressures of many
sorts may inadvertently conspire to create an atmosphere of coercion that may
even lead to rational, well-reasoned decisions, yet it may be difficult for a court or
other reviewing body to parse that decision post-hoc to allocate various levels of
burdens to each of the relevant players or factors in the final decisional outcome.
Thus, although sounding as if the recommendation is designed to ensure further
autonomy and individual protection, this recommendation is actually problematic
if it were ever to be implemented and begs the question of the line between social
good and individual choice in genetic decisions. See also, Ilise L. Feitshans, Ge-
netic Testing During Pregnancy: Implications For Womens' Autonomous Medical
Decisions Under the Genome Project (Thesis for Masters of Science Degree),
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF HYGIENE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (1996)
(on file with the University), citing WFN-IHA Recommendations with commen-
tary at pages 61 through 62. World Federation of Neurology, International Hunt-
ington's Association WFN-IHA GUIDELINES, NUMBER 2 further states that
individuals should the right to make these decisions alone but that laboratories
must meet "rigorous standards." This as a general public health policy matter re-
mains an open question, as some policymakers believe that genetic decisions im-
pact all of society and can only be made through the applications of technologies
that are developed for the public good. The notion that some genetic decisions are
too important for individuals to decide alone remains unresolved at the time of this
writing under law or related guidelines. See Ilise L. Feitshans, Genetic Testing Dur-
ing Pregnancy: Implications For Womens' Autonomous Medical Decisions Under
the Genome Project (Thesis for Masters of Science Degree), JOHNS HOPKINS UNI-
VERSITY SCHOOL OF HYGIENE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (1996) (on file with the Uni-
versity), citing WFN-IHA Recommendations with commentary at pages 59
through 63.
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ment, insurance, social security, data security and other
problems. ' 56 Recommendation 5.4 ensures that patients will have
access to "alternatives" to taking the test, including but not limited
to not taking the test or storing their DNA. 57 The IHA Recom-
mendations also offer guidance for prenatal and antenatal testing,
designed to ensure the integrity of the patient's medical decisions.
Recommendation 8 concerns the delivery of test results to patients
through counseling in person, rather than over the telephone or by
mail and the right to refuse having results. Decision making,
thereby providing additional protection against undesired disclo-
sure. HDA's recommendations therefore give a deeper practical ef-
fect to theoretical principles protecting patient autonomy regarding
medical decision making. This approach, giving primacy to autono-
mous decision-making, may also be applied to other genetic testing
than the decision whether to take the test for Huntington's Chorea
may also apply to other areas of genetic testing.
5 8
Huntington's disease is an example of a trait linked to a single
allele or dominant contrasting gene. It causes "loss of muscle con-
trol, uncontrollable physical spasms, severe mental illness, and
eventual death." For example, the presence of Huntington's disease
56 World Federation of Neurology, International Huntington's Association
WFN-IHA GUIDELINES, NUMBER 5.3.5. states that individuals should several types
of information to consider when making genetic decisions, specifically regarding
genetic testing for Huntington's disease, which is a late onset disease, impacting
individuals in the forty to fiftieth years of life. Similar to the models that have
been applied to HIV/AIDS testing, these factors weigh the so-called emotional
freight of testing and knowledge produced as a result of the test. See Ilise L. Feit-
shans, Genetic Testing During Pregnancy: Implications For Womens' Autonomous
Medical Decisions Under the Genome Project (Thesis for Masters of Science De-
gree), JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF HYGIENE AND PUBLIC HEALTH
(1996) (on file with the University), citing WFN-IHA Recommendations with com-
mentary at page 63.
57 World Federation of Neurology, International Huntington's Association
WFN-IHA GUIDELINES, NUMBER 5.4 states that individuals should have access to
"alternatives" to taking the test. This recasts in legislative format the notion of the
right "not to know" discussed above, as a method of striking a balance by creating
a counterweight to the free flow of information. See Ilise L. Feitshans, Genetic
Testing During Pregnancy: Implications For Womens' Autonomous Medical Deci-
sions Under the Genome Project (Thesis for Masters of Science Degree), JOHNS
HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF HYGIENE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (1996) (on file
with the University), citing WFN-IHA Recommendations with commentary at
page 62.
58 For IHA Recommendations on the "Right Not to Know" about Hunting-
ton's Chorea, see ALBERT TOWLE, MODERN BIOLOGY 171 (1993).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
can be detected with 99% accuracy. 59 While a positive test result
signals that an individual ultimately will get Huntington's disease, it
is impossible to predict when the. disease will manifest itself and
how quickly the person will become debilitated. Thus, an individ-
ual with the genetic markers for Huntington's disease may lead a
long, productive life before the onset of the debilitating symp-
toms. 60 IHA has recommended that genetic testing for Hunting-
ton's Disease be conducted only after counseling and only on
adults.
Despite the clarity of these recommendations, there is an un-
derlying confusion in theories and jurisprudence of privacy, which
ultimately affects the ability to devise analytically clean and forth-
right protections for the privacy rights, including the right not to
know, as eluded to by the HDA. Consistent with the salient charac-
teristic of international human rights jurisprudence, these docu-
ments represent a codification of the international consensus to
certain individual rights, such as the right to information or the
right to privacy, without offering more than vague support for the
notion that there should be international respect for these princi-
ples, and without fully addressing the necessary steps to achieve im-
plementation of their meaningful protection. -Examining these
provisions nonetheless provides a useful starting point in order to
determine the implications of privacy concerns for genetic issues in
public health law and policy. In addition, several international
human rights documents express the notion that there are separate
and distinct, or perhaps "special" protections that ensure maternal
health, especially during pregnancy. The intriguing separate regime
regarding human rights protections during pregnancy calls into
question whether "special" rights regarding privacy and autonomy
also have an impact upon prenatal medical decisions in general, and
genetic testing in the workplace. The sickle cell and sterilization
laws precedent raise concern that mandatory testing is a potential
tool for eugenics, enabling the state to filter out undesirable genetic
traits through obligatory testing. Experience with sickle cell anemia
testing suggests the dangers inherent to genetic testing. Like the
59 See Gin, supra note 19, at 1415 (pointing out that test to diagnose Hunt-
ington's disease may be administered at any time in a person's life and will have no
bearing in the accuracy of the diagnosis).
60 See Gin, supra note 19, at 1414-15 (estimating that the disease begins to
surface at age 35).
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sickle cell tests of the 1970s, scientists today understand relatively
little about genetic conditions. Although we have the ability to
identify an increasing number of genes, we don't understand the
relationship between genes, diseases and other human traits. Does
this history of discrimination based on inadequate scientific data
mean that people have a right NOT to have such personal informa-
tion studies, in order to protect them from discrimination? Or,
more importantly, to protect them from the harms they may suffer
from "Bad Science," despite the researcher's best intent?61 The
State's concern for the welfare of an infant justified blood transfu-
sions notwithstanding the special religious beliefs of the Jehovah's
Witnesses.62 But must be used wisely when fiercely competing in-
terests demand their respective rights. The path we choose will
shape humanity's destiny for many generations.
II. LEGAL AND MEDICAL CONSTRUCTS OF A HUMAN BEING
ENDOWED WITH HUMAN RIGHTS
How much genetic difference through cloning or other genetic
techniques will be tolerated under current definitions of humans?
Will the people produced under these technologies accept those
definitions or want a separate regime to govern themselves? Or will
they be second class citizens? Kings or slaves? Human rights and
the legal definition of "human being"? Tribe asks the precinct ques-
tion, regarding children of sperm donation: "If such a child devel-
ops an hereditary disease, does it violate the donor's privacy if the
state requires the sperm bank to reveal his identity to the parents
and physicians of the child?"
63
A. Who Holds the Human Right to Informational Privacy?
There will be two radical changes in the definition of family to
cope with social changes produced by the application and use of
genetic technologies: First, genetic technologies will uncover long-
standing historical biological linkages between many people who
61 See TROY DUSTER, BACK DOOR To EUGENICS (1990); see also Abby
Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and Rein-
forcing Inequities, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 34 (1991).
62 The Jefferson decision relied in part on the older case of Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985
(1964); see also State v. Perricone, 37. N.J. 463 (1962).
63 See TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1360.
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were treated as outcasts or outsiders to a given family, either
through secrecy, illegitimacy or distant social relations. This will
gain importance as we know more about the effects of that biology
and as people who perceive themselves to be victims of genetically-
based or genetically linked discriminations will band together for
common protection and safety in their interactions with the rest of
society. Second, even if all people are created equal, the law will
find it necessary to step in and decide who are people and what are
their relations to each other. Can a child who is linked to a celebrity
genetically claim inheritance from them, even if that child was
merely linked by donor eggs that were purchased from the celebrity
under contract and has different parents legally? Conversely, will
the same celebrity be bound by contract law or other laws to raise
and pay for the children who bear their name, but are not linked to
them biologically?
1. Rights of Other Individuals to One's Genetic Information
Third parties have an interest in genetic information because ge-
netic diseases by their very nature have an inherent intra familial
component that arguably gives rise to a duty to disclose genetic in-
formation. Third parties such as lost extended family or significant
others may be affected by information regarding genetic disease.
This approach to the protection of personal genetic information has
in fact been advanced by the Huntington's Disease Association. In-
ternational public law concerning human rights also offers protec-
tions for autonomy, integrity of the person and the right to
information about oneself or one's family members. 64
2. Family Members: Who is "Family"?
Genetic diseases run in families; but the high correlation between
many genetic disorders and race or ethnicity, makes difficult screen-
ing applicants for many diseases without violating U.S.A. Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act or the ADA. "The identification of relatives
found through genome mapping to be at risk for genetic disease
64 See U.N. CHARTER ARTICLES 13, 55, 62 reprinted in CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COLUMBIA UNIV., TWENTY-FIVE HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTS 1-5 (1994).
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may result in inflicting unwanted information on those
individuals.'
65
Furthermore, genetic information may also therefor reveal
other information about family links that was not previously known
but has unpredictable consequences, when an African American
claims lineage to a President two hundred years after his death.
66
Sickle cell anemia, Bloom's Syndrome, and other genetic diseases
inherited from parents are sometimes closely linked to particular
ethnic or racial groups such as African Americans, Ashkenazi Jews
and Armenians. 67 There is precedent for protecting the integrity of
family-based genetic information, insofar as family genetics are an
extension of laws regarding genetic traits and race. Courts have
found that tests for sickle cell anemia disproportionately impact Af-
rican Americans. Many states prohibit employer testing for the dis-
ease. In EEOC v. Trailways, Inc.,68 the court struck down a
regulation requiring bus drivers to be clean shaven. The regulation
was struck because it had a discriminatory impact on African
Americans who demonstrated a higher incidence of a skin disorder
that made shaving painful. 69 Similarly, most of the employers who
pioneered sickle cell testing soon stopped, and some states have
now prohibited the testing because of its disparate impact on Afri-
can Americans.
70
65 RUTH MACKLIN, MAPPING THE HUMAN GENOME, in GENETICS AND THE
LAW III (1984); see also Lori Andrews & Ami Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic
Information in the Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75, 81 (1991).
66 See Melissa Hendricks, A Daughter's Declaration, JOHNS HOPKINS UNI-
VERSITY MAGAZINE, (Sept/Fall 1999), Cover Story (demonstrating that she is the
eighth generation after President Thomas Jefferson's black son, whose mother was
Jefferson's slave).
67 Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, The Genetic "Quick Fix" and the
Jewish Community, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 97, 98 (1997) (noting that nearly one per-
cent of sampled Eastern European Jews contain a genetic predisposition to breast
and ovarian cancer); see also Katherine Brokaw, Comment, Genetic Screening in
the Workplace and Employers' Liability, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 317, 324
(1990).
68 EEOC v. Trailways Inc., 530 F. Supp 54 (D. Colo. 1981).
69 But see Woods v. Safeway Stores, 420 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Va. 1976) (uphold-
ing the dismissal of African American employees who grew beards as a result of a
skin condition where customers found bearded workers in a grocery store
distasteful).
70 See generally Fla. Stat. Ann. § 448.076 (West 1997) (prohibiting sickle cell
trait screening as a condition of employment); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23.352 (West
1998) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sickle cell trait).
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B. Tensions with Disability Rights
New genetic knowledge seems destined to bring ge-
netic tests that will collide with a growing movement
for disability rights. The battleground is likely to be
prenatal genetic testing. For a disorder such as Tay-
Sachs disease, dying, prenatal testing is generally ac-
cepted. Abortion of a prospective child destined to a
short life filled with pain and inability to respond to the
world is, to most, a morally acceptable if tragic choice.
Abortion for conditions with greater clinical variabil-
ity, with a mix of genetic and environmental causes of
lesser severity or with late onset are less obviously ben-
eficial ...Choosing abortion on the basis of an ex-
pected disability raises the specter of choosing what
kind of children there should be. The choices implicitly
force judgments that echo debates about what lives are
worth living, arguments that in an earlier era
mushroomed into Nazi atrocities. 71
Currently under international law, without stating what blood
or other relationship constitutes a "family," protects "the right to
found a family" as a "fundamental group unit" of society, UDHR
Article 16.3 provides, "The family is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
State." This law does not resolve conflicts within this "fundamental
group unit" when there are competing interests, such as the poten-
tial conflict of interest between parent and fetus.72 For example,
neither international norms nor U.S. law specifically grants rights to
children or the unborn. International laws, however, have codified
such rights, without defining "human" or "child." Article 6.1 recog-
nizes that "every child has an inherent right to life," and Article 6.2,
"States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the sur-
vival and development of the child."' 73 This law provides assurances
71 ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS 251 (1994).
72 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 23(1); In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 6,
7(b), 10.
73 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 6 (entered into
force on 2 September 1990 in accordance with Article 49(1)) reprinted in COLUM-
BIA UNIVERSITY, TWENTY-FIVE HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS (J. Paul Martin ed.,
1994).
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of education, housing, nationality, a name, prevention of forced
separation of children from their parents. The European Social
Charter Part I,(7) clearly states, "Children and young persons have
the right to a special protection against the physical and moral
hazards to which they are exposed.
'74
III. APPLICATION OF LEGAL CONCEPTS TO LABOR RELATIONS
AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
Spider Silk Jeans or Spider Silk Genes: Can We Make People Who
Can Work Without Sleep?
Lescohier described in the History of Labor Laws the evolu-
tion of many of the major labor laws that had come into force in the
U.S.A. before or during the Great Depression of the 1930's. That
book,75 written contemporary to the Great Depression and there-
fore before most of the laws impacting health in workplaces today
demonstrates that working conditions in general and employment
laws that govern them have remained remarkably unchanged de-
spite changes in technology; few changes in circumstances; para-
digms remain surprisingly constant. 76 This makes good sense,
however, if we look with a very sweeping brush of history at work-
ing conditions in different civilizations and cultures across geo-
graphic differences, national boundaries and time. The hallmark of
the 2 0 th century was the use of technology to undo the hard work of
the Progressive Era, which brought strong wage and hour laws and
limits on work.
74 European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Part I (7), Council of Europe (en-
tered into force on Feb. 26, 1965).
75 DON D. LESCOHIER AND ELIZABETH BRANDEIS, HISTORY OF LABOR IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932 (MacMillan and Co. 1935).
76 Comments to US Dept of Labor's National Advisory Committee on Oc-
cupational Safety and Health (NACOSH) (June 6, 1997), and upon a chapter in the
book, BRINGING HEALTH TO WORK, (Emalyn Press 1997). An earlier version of
this paper and the videotape were presented at the First International conference
on Occupational and Environmental Prevention, International Commission on Oc-
cupational Health (ICOH) Rome, Italy, 1998 and published in the ISRAEL JOUR-
NAL OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (2000), Vol. 4, no. 1, pp 63-66, entitled Lessons
Learned: three centuries of occupational health laws, noting that many of the envi-
ronmental, sanitation and public health issues that we grapple with today remain
unresolved but important across the centuries and were addressed by laws in the
colonial and early federal periods.
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In recent years, Monsanto Corporation spent $8 billion devel-
oping genetically modified seeds that it has patented. 77 Genetically
modified seeds offer a significantly higher yield at harvest, but can-
77 Genetically engineered seeds and foods from genetically engineered
sources not only raise ethical issues, but have remained commercially controver-
sial. Many nations view these seeds as an attempt to create a new form of eco-
nomic monopoly, because the seeds require new purchases ever time the farmer
wishes to start a crop. Although the genetically engineered seeds produce a greater
harvest, they cannot reproduce themselves. Thus farmers cannot save, aside part of
a good crop to plant the next growing season, and become obligated to purchase
new seeds each growing year. This has been the subject of lively on-line discussion
at OEM-L, run by Duke University School of Medicine, because the health effects
of many years of consuming such genetically engineered virulent but sterile crops
are also unknown, leading to questions about the future of excessive long-term
human consumption of the crops from genetically engineered seeds. These ques-
tions will be resolved by science in the years ahead, but have been litigated in the
face of scientific uncertainty while the technologies remain unknown. For example,
in Brazil, a judge enjoined sale of Monsanto Corp.'s patented soybean seeds until
the government developed bio-safety rules. Soybean farmers planned to buy the
seeds illegally from salesmen from Argentina, where they are legal. The farmers
say they need the seeds to boost yields and keep competitive. See Today's "Toxic
News for the Net," available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/opptnb.txt; see also
Jack Epstein, WASHINGTON TIMES, Brazil Battles Over Ban on Altered Beans (30
August 99), at A14. Japan will require labeling on 28 food items that contain de-
tectable genetically modified organisms, or GMOs. UN Rulings Regarding Genet-
ically Modified Food: The Codex Alimentarius Commission. The U.N. Food
Safety Agency with 101 member nations ruled unanimously in favor of the 1993
European moratorium on Monsanto's genetically engineered hormonal milk
(rBGH). The Codex Commission ruling has stopped the US challenge to the Euro-
pean moratorium before the World Trade Organization. U.S.A.'s FDA approved
the sale of unlabeled rBGH milk in February 1994, supported by the Food and
Agriculture/ World Health Organization's (FAOIWHO) Joint Expert Committees
on Food Additives (JECFA), in its September 1.998 report, which did not find ad-
verse veterinary or public health impacts. The Codex Committee subsequently
endorsed by the parent Codex Health Canada in January 1.999 issued a formal
"notice of non-Compliance," disapproving future sales of rBGH. See Monsanto's
Genetically Modified Milk Ruled Unsafe by The United Nations available at http://
news.excite.com/news/pr/990818/il-un-milk-safety.
International guidelines for organic foods were an agenda item of the 23rd
Session of the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome 28 June to 3
July 1999:
International guidelines on organically produced foods are impor-
tant for consumer protection and information and because they fa-
cilitate trade. They are also Useful to governments wishing to
develop regulations in this area, including developing countries and
countries in Eastern Europe.
See FAO/WHO Commission to Set Guidelines for Organic Foods, available at
www.fao.org/news/1999/990608-e.htmFuture Directions in USA Laws.
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not reproduce themselves, so farmers must buy seeds from the pat-
ent-holder again each year. By contrast, people cannot genetically
engineer or change their own parents; people cannot genetically en-
gineer or predict their grandchildren.
Within these two constants, the history of agriculture, preven-
tive measures in public health and medicine is about legally chang-
ing the ability to achieve human potential; the possibility to
improve or enhance the human race. In the next years, humanity
will have the information to change many of these aspects of ge-
netic destiny. Genes linked to color blindness, colon cancer, Hunt-
ington's disease, Downs Syndrome, or other conditions that are
considered to be a "defect" today may be altered or deleted
through new treatments or cures. For others, genes bring special
gifts, such as physical strength, great intelligence, artistic ability or
musical talent. Enhancement will be available to alter the capabili-
ties of individuals and in turn, human potential, unless there are
specific limits or safeguards on such enhancements under law.
Maybe humans are different from foods like vegetable seeds, but
maybe also the organisms that will resemble people but will be pro-
duced as a result of genetic engineering are not humans. Or are
treated like human beings for some social purposes, but are not
considered to be human beings under laws. The law has not yet
addressed the rights of people or tissue masses that are cultivated
for the manufacture and sale of human parts: Scientists demanded
a moratorium on human cloning research in 1997. In response,
President Clinton proposed legislation to impose a five-year ban on
human cloning.78
78 The Cloning Prohibition Act of 1997 would have banned both the public
and private sectors from using cloning technology to create a child but does not
impact biomedical and agricultural advances. See Bioethics Commission Backs
Federal Human Cloning Ban Pending More Study, Debate, 15 MEALEY'S LITIC.
REP.: BIOTECHNOLOGY, June 13, 1997. The Human Cloning Research Prohibition
Act of 1997 proposed a ban on the cloning of human embryos. The Act does not
restrict areas of scientific inquiry that involves: "(1) the use of somatic cell nuclear
transfer or other cloning technologies to clone molecules, DNA, cells other than
human embryo cells, or tissues; or (2) the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer tech-
niques to create animals other than humans." Id.
42 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
A. Laws Prohibiting Genetic Discrimination
Definitions of disability under law are elastic79; changing to
meet new developments in genetics. Eventually, social constructs
determining the interpretation of "disability" under law may not
include certain treatable conditions, that could be "cured" or ren-
dered less debilitating using technology discovered through the gen-
ome project. Conversely, future interpretations of the term
"disability" may have a broader scope, expanding to include condi-
tions and effects of chromosomal abnormalities that have not yet
been discovered. 80
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT:
Generally, genetic information does not reveal anything about
an individual's present ability to perform job functions safely and
successfully. Rather, the information may reveal risks to the indi-
vidual, but not risks to fellow workers. The government can express
some interest in the protection of its workers against unnecessary
risk of disease. Risks to co-workers could arguably support intru-
sive testing to secure the safety of co-workers. 81 The U.S. Congress
enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") to
protect individuals with disabilities from discrimination in such crit-
79 The EEOC definition of "disability" includes genetic predispositions
under the Americans With Disabilities Act, (ADA). See EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL 45. "This part of the definition of 'disability' applies to individuals who
are subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic information relating to ill-
ness, disease, or other disorders. Covered entities that discriminate against individ-
uals on the basis of such genetic information are regarding the individuals as
having impairments that substantially limit a major life activity." See id. at 902-45;
see also Brian R. Gin, Genetic Discrimination: Huntington's Disease and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1406, 1406 (1997).
80 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (major life activity
under ADA: U.S. Department of Justice and the Equal Employment opportunity
Commission define the term "major life activity" in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions as "functions such as caring for one['s] self, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."). See also
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that an HIV infected individual
was disabled because the possible transfer of disease to the next generation im-
paired the ability to reproduce). If a potential parent may pass a "genetic defect"
to the next generation, the ADA may be interpreted as prohibiting genetic dis-
crimination as protecting such individuals based on their impaired ability to
reproduce. Id.
81 See Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 833. (51h Cir. 1990).
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ical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, educa-
tion, transportation, and communication.
'82
There are few statutory limitations, but the law does not apply
if a disabled person also presents a direct threat to be "a significant
risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provi-
sion of auxiliary aids or services. ' 83 Upon acceptance of an offer, 42
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A) allows medical testing upon acceptance of
an offer if all employees are tested as such.84 Under the ADA, an
employer cannot conduct pre-offer medical examinations on an ap-
plicant unless it can prove that the information so provided was not
used in making job assignments or in any other discriminatory man-
ner. In addition, the employer is prohibited from asking an appli-
cant about the existence or severity of any disability. The employer
may, however, inquire into the ability of the applicant to perform
job-related functions so long as employee disclosure is voluntary
and confidential.85 According to an often-quoted EEOC policy
statement, genetic discrimination falls under the term disability as
defined in the ADA.86 The Ninth Circuit has recognized the possi-
bility of a privacy claim based on genetic testing in a publicly owned
laboratory. 87 Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 ("ADA") to protect individuals with disabilities from dis-
crimination in such critical areas as employment, housing, public
82 ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits . . .[a] major life activity..." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). A major life
activity includes the ability to reproduce. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624.
83 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994). See also Lynda M. Fox & Sherman G.
Finesilver, Genetics and the Workplace: ADA Applicability to Genetic Information,
26 COLO. L. Rev. 75, 75 (1997) (citing Warren Leary, Using Gene Tests to Deny
Jobs is Ruled Illegal, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 8, 1995, at A12) (reporting that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission considers the use of genetic tests discrimi-
natory if used to deny employment without informing the applicants of the tests
against discrimination ... shall include medical examinations and inquiries.").
84 29 C.F.R. 1630.14(c) "A covered entity may require a medical examina-
tion ... of an employee that is job-related and consistent with business necessity."
Id.
85 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (ADA definition of disability).
86 See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 79, at 902-45; see also Fox
and Finesilver, supra note 83; Reuters, Genes and Discrimination: Gore Urges
Laws Banning Bias in Hiring and Insurance, NEWSDAY, Jan. 21, 1998, at A20
(Vice-President Gore has been quoted as saying, "Genetic progress should not be-
come a new excuse for discrimination.").
87 See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 ( 9 th
Cir. 1998) (acknowledging a cause of action based on privacy).
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accommodations, education, transportation, and communication
ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits . [a] major life activity .... -88
The ADA recognizes, however, the right of employers to ask
questions about disabilities in limited situations. In requesting this
information the employer must inform the applicant that it is for
remedial or affirmative action purposes, it is entirely voluntary, and
that the information will be kept confidential and will not be used
to discriminate against the applicant. EEOC guidelines suggest that
an employer may list the essential job functions and ask an appli-
cant whether he or she is capable of performing those functions.
After the offer of employment has been extended: ADA provides
that "[a] covered entity may require a medical examination after an
offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to
the commencement of the employment duties of such applicant,
and may condition an offer of employment on the results of such
examination." 89 These examinations must satisfy three require-
ments. First, an employer must test all entering employees regard-
less of disability. Second, the information collected must be
maintained on separate forms and in a separate medical file and
treated as confidential. Medical examinations may be used only "in
accordance with this sub-chapter." 90
ADA protects applies to individuals who are subjected to dis-
crimination on the basis of genetic information relating to illness,
disease, or other disorders. 91 Courts consider several factors in bal-
ancing an employee's interest against the expense to an employer.
The factors to be considered include: (1) the nature and cost of the
modifications; (2) the overall financial resources of the facility; (3)
the number of employees at the facility; (4) the overall financial
resources of the entire company; (5) the type of operations of the
88 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
89 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a). "A covered entity may make pre-employment
inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions and/or
may ask an applicant to describe or to demonstrate how, with or without reasona-
ble accommodation, the applicant will be able to perform job-related functions."
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a).
90 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) ("A covered en-
tity may require a medical examination ... after making an offer of employment
• . . and may condition an offer of employment on the results of such
examination.").
91 See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 79. See also EEOC INTER-
PRETIVE MANUAL 902.4(c)(1).
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company; and (6) the impact the accommodations would have on
the operations at the facility.92 The EEOC has not given guidelines
as to how each of these factors should be weighed to determine
whether accommodating a disabled worker would be an undue
hardship.93
B. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
1. Purposes of OSH Act
The field of occupational health and safety encompasses many
types of work and many aspects of municipal, state and interna-
tional laws that could not be embraced by any single Act of Con-
gressional legislation. Thus the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 ("OSH Act") 94 merely represents one Act
among several laws governing occupational safety and health legis-
lation nationwide. The OSH Act was passed with the express pur-
pose: "To provide safe and healthful employment and places of
employment for every working man and woman in the Nation...
by providing medical criteria which will assure insofar as practica-
ble that no employee will suffer diminished health, functional ca-
pacity, or life expectancy as a result of his (sic) work experience.
'95
Employers may have a countervailing duty to use genetic data
to protect people with genetic predispositions to disease by exclud-
ing them from certain environments where they are more likely to
be harmed. i.e., people who are slow acetylators, and are sensitive
to phenotype aromatic amines used in dyes.96 People with this ge-
netic propensity and exposed to certain dyes are believed to have a
higher risk of bladder cancer. This conclusion was based on Ash-
ford's study concerning workers with occupational exposure to ben-
zidine. "Qualitatively, therefore, evidence of some increased
susceptibility in this case is relatively strong. It is not possible from
these limited data to calculate how much greater the risk of similar
92 See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(p)(2).
93 See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(p) app. at 353-54 (stating "in other cases, considera-
tion of the financial resources of the employer... may be inappropriate because it
may not give an accurate picture of the financial resources available to the particu-
lar facility that will actually be required to provide the accommodation.").
94 29 U.S.C. § 651.
95 29 U.S.C. § 651.
96 NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD, ET. AL. MONITORING THE WORKER FOR ExPO-
SURE AND DISEASE: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
USE OF BIOMARKERS, 74 (1990).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
aromatic amine exposure might be for average people with "slow"
phenotype. However, the indicated difference seems likely to be at
least several-fold. Whether this is enough to justify screening pro-
grams is a social policy judgment that needs to be made in light of
the absolute magnitude of the risk indicated for a specific exposed
population, and other opportunities to reduce risk."'97
2. OSHA's Role
In the United States, OSHA's statutory mission makes OSHA
responsible for "preserving our National Resources" by protecting
safety and health at work. The key term is found in the title and in
the purposes, Section 2(b) of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 ("OSH Act") where the U.S. Congress wrote the word,
"HEALTH." The three decade old statute is consistent with the
international laws discussed above, and clearly shares the values
codified by the international human rights laws and their cultural
matrix. Promoting "HEALTH" is not about the many issues that
polarize labor and management relations; issues that frequently
cloud the progress towards achieving OSHA's statutory goal of pro-
tecting safety and health in every workplace throughout our nation.
Promoting health is about asking hard questions and sometimes
making unpopular decisions preventing economic loss to fragile
families; preventing industrial disasters and ultimately saving
human life. We do not know today, whether the redefinition of
"work," "employer," "employee," and "occupation" that we will
experience will undermine occupational health laws, hard-won
workers' compensation and wage and hour laws, but it is easy to
predict from this history that a great deal of scientific and medical
expert testimony will be written and evaluated in order to resolve
the questions that lay at the heart of these age-old controversies.
Laws have already emerged that prohibit underwriting or rating
based on specifically identified genetic traits. Some states bar ge-
netic testing altogether from underwriting or rating, barring insur-
ance industry use of genetic information broadened beyond
information collected in laboratory tests, such as the Oregon law
that banned the use of genetic tests for employer-based insurance
purposes.98
97 Id.
98 Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.700 (1997).
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C. Legal Models for Informed Consent Regarding
Genetic Testing
1. Historical Antecedents of U.S. Informed Consent Law
Privacy is intertwined with the concept of control over oneself.
Cases establishing the requirement that a patient consent before
being administered any medical treatment, every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body, and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is lia-
ble in damages. 99 These notions seem impractical, if not totally uto-
pian in the current workplace context. The application of these
principles presumes a great deal of knowledge and choice that most
workers lack in the overall balance of power in labor relations. Fur-
ther, the concept of informed consent has two pitfalls: it presumes
the state-of-the-art of genetic testing and application of genetic in-
formation will be such that it will be reliable, without untoward side
effects and without unforseen disastrous outcomes. More impor-
tantly, the use of informed consent in the workplace context is
problematic because it erodes the workers' compensation compro-
mise that promised workers would not be accountable under the
assumption of the risk doctrine. That doctrine was used to hold
workers unduly liable for any or all damages in the workplace for
hundreds of years. It was overturned by 2 0th century legislation.
Informed Consent: "True consent to what happens to one's self
informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to
evaluate knowledgeably the options ...The average patient has
little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has
only his physician to whom he can look for enlightenment with
which to reach an intelligent decision. From these almost axiomatic
considerations springs the need, and in turn the requirement, of a
reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make such a deci-
sion possible." 100
99 HOLTZMAN, N., PROCEED WITH CAUTION at 186, (Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press 1989) (quoting, Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211
N.Y. 125 (191.4))
100 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-81 (1972) (this principal has been
extended to give patients the right to forego life-sustaining medical care. "Patient
consent must be obtained every time information changes hands."); see also
Chouinard v. Marjani, 575 A.2d 238 (Conn.App.Ct. 1990).
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2. Autonomy-Based Model For Informed Consent Law in the
Wake of AIDS
Bayer and Kirp posit two "polar ideal types," of a "contain and
control strategy" and a "cooperation and inclusion strategy," ap-
proach to prevention in public health policy, that is the hallmark of
the "post-antibiotic era" where patterns of behavior are "rooted in
the normative structures of the communities at risk." AIDS-rights
advocates lobbied for new laws that protect confidentiality, individ-
ual rights and civil liberties over the traditional "coercive" ap-
proach antithetical to civil liberties: quarantine, partner
notification, contact tracing, mandatory testing, registries,
mandatory reporting, mandatory testing for pregnant women as
"vectors" of disease and mandatory newborn screening, all without
informed consent. Experience from the AIDS pandemic therefore
initiated several legal changes that provide a valid precedent for
preserving genetic privacy to prevent discrimination by employers
and insurers.
CONCLUSIONS: THE PATH MUST BE CHOSEN SOON
Genetic technology from HGI industry will raise a host of new
property, tort, and constitutional questions. To what extent will we
permit intellectual property rights in genetic tests and materials or
the actual ownership of human embryos? Will we be able to patent
biological parts just as we can now patent biologically engineered
plants and bacteria? What will the law have to say about cloning
human body parts by test-tube genetic engineering or cloning a
human being by manipulating germ cells? Will it be legal to patent
human genetic characteristics? And will any or all of those changes
be required under law, or for specific jobs?
This paper has described the current legal systems that will be
used to address emerging genetic testing issues in the workplace.
Law may approach new genetic technologies using traditional laws
family laws, intellectual property, public health and informed con-
sent laws or by embracing existing definitions of discrimination. As
in the case of HIV testing, the modern paradigm has shifted away
from the "invasiveness" of testing, towards a hard look at the emo-
tional burden that testing places upon patients and how the infor-
mation will be used: whether as a vehicle for unwanted
discrimination, or for public health benefits, or commercial applica-
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tion of information in profitable new markets. Whether significant
scientific concepts, will play a strong role in shaping the social re-
sponse, as articulated by legislatures and as implemented by occu-
pational physicians in daily practice, up to the people in this room.
Although the legislature is vested with powers that science lacks,
there has been a grafting of science onto the actual laws and texts of
the statutes. It can be expected that courts will admit into evidence
a vast variety of genetic information that never would have previ-
ously been acceptable in a court of law. There is no need for a pro-
posal for science courts, as was offered in the early 1960's during
the Cold War and the "Space Race" to bring the latest technology
to every school child in the U.S.A. Our courts of law are de facto
science courts already. Instead, what is needed is not a science
court or a new set of science-evidence rules for the application of
genetic technologies to daily life; a system that will meaningfully
bring genetics to the science of governance: jurisprudence, by ena-
bling scientists to bring their full participation and knowledge to
existing judicial decision making structures, that will prohibit cer-
tain types of bad uses of information, such as the resurrection of the
assumption of the risk doctrine by providing sham forms for work-
place "informed consent."
Congress has said that science and medicine have a place and
should be appropriately integrated into the various parts of our le-
gal system. And courts have listened by accepting all types of scien-
tific and medical testimony that went unheard decades or a century
ago. There is ongoing concern, however that courts will supplant
their own judgment regarding the validity, reliability and probative
value of scientific evidence. This can only be remedied by having
scientists sit as judges. In fact, such courts exist under our present
laws and with occupational physicians beside the legislatures as
they define genetics for future workplaces.
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